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## II.—THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN INDEPENDENT SENTENCES IN PLAUTUS.

### II.—FORCES.

The presentation of the facts of usage in the preceding part of this paper should make upon any reader who may have patience to follow it the same impression that is made by the facts themselves, the impression that, in the last analysis, the subjunctive use consists of a great variety of more or less specialized usages, differing often but slightly, yet distinct and deserving separate treatment. Some are narrow in range and clearly defined, like *haud dicam dolo, egone ausim, ueniat uelim*; others are broader and of more general application, like the use of the 2d singular of the present, and have scarcely crystallized into definite meaning. These varieties of usage are, it is true, connected not only by the unity of the mode, but also by resemblances which justify somewhat more specific terms: jussive, hortatory, deliberative. But it must, I think, be acknowledged that the study of resemblances, the grouping and re-grouping of usages which are for the most part ill-defined, has not greatly advanced our knowledge of syntax during the last quarter of a century. The search for a *Grundbegriff* has not been fruitless in suggestion, but it has been less productive of real advance than might have been hoped. What we call 'the subjunctive' is not an entity; it has no objective existence. Only the individual subjunctive forms—*sim, dicam*—exist, and the term 'the subjunctive' is the result of a generalization by which we endeavor to include in a single idea all that is common to the many individual forms or the narrow and clearly defined usages. No single form or usage exactly corresponds to the type; each falls short of the type in some particulars and in other particulars each may have acquired suggestions of meaning which are not found in the type. By a process analogous to natural selection, a process partly of exclusion, partly of acquisition, indiscriminate and therefore shifting applications of the modal forms have crystallized into definite and therefore expressive usage. The understanding of this

process—and this is the true work of the student of historical syntax—must begin with detailed and precise description and definition of usage, such as I have attempted to give above; the second step is the discussion of the forces which have been at work to produce such usages.

These forces are of two kinds:—*first*, each subjunctive has person, number, tense, voice, and the stem of the verb has its own proper meaning. *Second*, each subjunctive stands in a particular setting, in a sentence of a particular kind, interrogative or not, with particles or adverbs which limit it and at the same time suggest additional meanings, often in a paratactic relation to another verb, sometimes with a negative, preceded by other sentences and conditioned by all the preceding course of thought, and, in the spoken language, made definite by the circumstances, by inflection and by gesture. Of these two kinds of forces, the first are of course inseparable from the form; the influence of person and number upon the modal meaning, whatever it may be, must always have accompanied and modified the subjunctive. In part this is true also of the forces of the second kind, but the additions to the subjunctive, especially the paratactic verbs, are later and are at the same time definitions of the subjunctive and evidence of the need of definition.

In the study of these forces I have two objects in view. *First*, a conscious and deliberate weighing of the various elements which make up what we call the 'context' ought to give greater precision to our interpretation. *Second*, in so far as it can be shown that the usages described above are the result of known forces, working along traceable lines, the necessity and, indeed, the scientific propriety of referring such usages to supposed I.E. functions falls away. If, for example, any other forces can be found which of themselves are sufficient to limit *di te perduint* to a curse or *saluos sis* to a greeting, then it is not permissible to explain them as survivals of an I.E. optative function or to attempt to show how the optative function extended to the subjunctive forms *di te perdant* and *valeas*.

The discussion of these forces is not in any case complete, but I have hoped that it might be suggestive of a point of view somewhat different from the usual one. Only the more salient points are brought out under each head, and no attempt has been made to trace the influence of each force upon every kind of subjunctive usage. Thus, under person and number the hypothetical cases

and the questions are not touched, because they are chiefly influenced by other forces.

### 1. *Person and Number.*

Four acts are connected in thought with every subjunctive: speaking, willing, hearing and performing the action expressed by the verb. These four acts may be done by one, two, three or, rarely, by four persons.

In the 1st person singular these acts may be performed by one person; the speaker may express his own will to himself about an act which he is to do. These cases, however, are rare, partly because the occasion is rare, partly because other expressions like the periphrastic are more precise. Where such forms do occur, it is evident that the function of the mode is much restricted. The will of the speaker cannot take the form of command or entreaty; it is limited to ideas of propriety or necessity or determination. And even for these ideas the bare subjunctive form is an inadequate expression, needing to be supplemented by a paratactic addition like *optumumst, necessest*. In general, either the speaker divides himself and by a fiction, a dramatic doubling of his personality, addresses himself in the forms of the 2d person, which can express command or entreaty, or else the sentence is addressed to another person. In the latter case the verb is not really an expression of will, but a statement to the other person of the speaker's determination—that is, it is a future. This is, of course, a very common situation, and most of the 3d-conjugation forms in Plautus show by their context that they are of this kind. The line of division, however, is faint. Asin. 605, *sermoni iam finem face tuo: huius sermonem accipiam*, is like Trin. 1136, *quid ego cesso hos conloqui? sed maneam etiam, opinor*, in expressing desire rather than determination, but it shades toward the future because it is half addressed to the other person. So also in Asin. 719 *ecastor ambae sunt bonae. || sciam, ubi boni quid dederint*.

In the large majority of cases in 1st sing. the willer is the person addressed, the speaker and actor being one person. These cases are in questions and will be treated below.

The very fact, then, that a verb is used in 1st sing. of the subjunctive restricts the possible meaning of the mode within narrow limits and tends to produce a well-marked though infrequent usage. So strong, in fact, is the force of person and

number in this case that it, as it were, compels the subjunctive to express ideas of necessity and propriety which are more naturally expressed by other forms.

In the 2d pers. sing. the speaker and willer is one person, the hearer and actor another person, who is present. The relation of willer and actor is the most direct and simple possible. It needs no definition; its definiteness even helps to define the nature of the will. For the kind of will exerted, though it is not defined by the verb, is of necessity fixed by the relation of the persons—father to son, master to slave, friend to friend—and by the circumstances, which are, so to speak, visible to both and unconsciously taken for granted in the selection of expressions. Definiteness of language is unnecessary where the hearer must understand sufficiently the sense in which the speaker, standing before him, wills the action. On the one hand, therefore, the use in 2d sing. is limited to the more direct expressions of will, and on the other hand there is no need of distinct forms to differentiate advice from command or entreaty from demand, because this distinction is implied in the circumstances. The wish without *utinam* is almost unknown; the two cases, in the marriage song in Cas. and in the curse in Trin. 351 (if *malum* be read, with GS.), are only half-wishes.<sup>1</sup>

In the 3d sing. three persons are involved, the speaker and willer, the hearer, and the actor, not present or treated as not present. The bare subjunctive (without paratactic additions) is therefore indefinite in two respects. First, in all cases where the subject of the verb is not a definite person, and occasionally even when the actor is definite, there is nothing in the relation of the persons to define the mode, either by the exclusion of many kinds of will, as in 1st sing., or by a direct and evident relation of willer to actor, as in 2d singular. Second, the separation of hearer from actor leaves the part which the former is to play undefined. For the details I will refer to what has been said above in describing the uses of the 3d sing. present. The vary-

<sup>1</sup> It may be noted in passing that the gap in meaning between 1st sing. fut. and 1st sing. pres. subj. is much less than in 2d sing. In 1st sing. determination runs into futurity (English *will* into *shall*), and many futures like *ibo* express determination. But in the 2d pers. the subjunctive expresses clear forms of will, while the future expresses futurity with little trace of will. Therefore, while *dicam* serves for both modes, the 2d person selects the two differing forms *dicas* and *dices*.

ing relations of the hearer to the action are of course not expressed in the mode; they are indeed not expressed at all in language except in the paratactic uses, but the fact that they exist and are in the mind of both speaker and hearer tends, by a common law of language, to associate them with the form. In other words, the 3d sing. vaguely suggests to the hearer that he also is to act. If *ferat* alone is used in the sense of *iube ferat*, it comes to mean *iube ferat*. And this comes out more plainly when the subject is a thing and the verb is passive; by necessary implication *efferrantur omnia* means *fac efferrantur*.<sup>1</sup>

Further evidence of the way in which the meaning of the mode seems to be shifted by causes which lie outside the mode may be had from the cases of 3d pers. where the subject is not a definite person. With an ideal or typical person (Amph. 960 *proinde eri ut sint, ipse [the slave] item sit*; Pers. 125 *cynicum esse egentem oportet parasitum probe: pallium, marsuppium habeat*) the subjunctive expresses only propriety, the direct forms of will being excluded. So when persons of a class are the subject (*reges, inimici*), especially if they are in the audience and are addressed indirectly (*matronae tacitae spectent, tacitae rideant*, Poen. prol. 32). When the subject is a thing and the verb is passive, the hearer becomes the real actor, and the direct forms of will reappear, as in the 2d person.

In one class the 3d pers., sing. as well as plur., is rather narrowly defined. The wishes containing the word *di* or the name of a god are definite in respect to the nature of the desire and to the actors. The nature of the desire is partly fixed by the meaning of the verb, which will be discussed later, but the fact that the gods are to be the actors, not only in wishes like *di me ament*, but also in the impersonal expressions *male sit tibi, quod bene uortat*, excludes advice or command and confines the mode to the expression of that kind of desire whose attainment is beyond human power. The fact, also, that the gods are not directly addressed excludes prayer and entreaty.

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps not speculating too freely to hazard the guess that it is the vagueness of the 3d pers. which rendered possible the wide extension of usage in the subordinate clause in narrative Latin. I am very sure that in tracing the origin of subordinate clauses careful attention should be paid to the person of the verb. Clauses in the 1st or 2d pers. are more likely to be idiomatic and to be directly connected with independent uses, while it is the 3d pers. which swings away most widely from independent uses and develops special subordinate functions.

Of all the varieties of subjunctive, none is more clearly defined than the 1st plural. In it the speaker and willer is an actor and the person addressed is also an actor; it combines, as has often been remarked, the 1st person with the 2d, and can therefore be used only in those senses which are common to both. This excludes almost entirely all uses like command, permission, entreaty, advice, and leaves only the special sense which we call exhortation. No name in all our imperfect grammatical nomenclature is more suitable and more precise than Hortatory, if it be confined, as I think it should be, to the 1st pers. plural.

In a few cases in 1st plur. the subjunctive has somewhat the effect of a command, where *tu* (Truc. 840 *eamus tu in ius*) or a vocative (Poen. 1342 *leno, eamus in ius*) is expressed. That is, where the 2d person is brought forward into prominence, the direct shades of will which are associated with the 2d person also appear.

The forms of the sigmatic aorist afford a striking proof of the effect of person upon mode. All cases in 1st sing. are hypothetical, all in 2d pers. are prohibitive, all but one in 3d pers. are optative. It seems certain that the force which produced this curious difference between *faxim*, *faxis* and *faxit* can have been nothing else than the person. It is true that the 1st sing. in general is not always hypothetical, but it leans more strongly that way than the 2d or the 3d, while the 2d pers. in general leans toward the direct forms of command and the 3d pers. contains by far the largest number of wishes. These general tendencies, working upon forms which were becoming obsolete and were therefore preserved only in idiomatic uses, brought about an absolute uniformity of usage in the sigmatic aorist, which would be impossible with forms which were in free and general use.

These illustrations will, I hope, show sufficiently how greatly the modal meaning is influenced by the force of person and number, and how necessary a recognition of this force is to precise interpretation. It is in the main an exclusive or selective force. Of the whole range of possible applications, certain ones are excluded when the speaker addresses himself about his own action, certain others when the hearer is to be the actor. But it is also capable of leading to an expansion of modal meaning by association and suggestion. The idea of propriety or conformity to an ideal implied in some of the 3d-pers. uses is such an extension, and in the forms of the sigmatic aorist these added conceptions have become permanently associated with the mode.

2. *Tense.*

The influence of tense-force upon the modal meaning is slight. Tense-force in the subjunctive is in general less clearly marked than in the indicative, partly because the very nature of the subjunctive removes it somewhat from time limitations (e. g. in the hypothetical uses, which are often timeless), partly because in a considerable number of cases the will and the act belong to different times. So Ps. 131 *ostium lenonis crepuit. || crura mauel-lem modo*, Curc. 512 *tacuisse mauellem*; in neither case is *mauel-lem* parallel to *malebam*. Pers. 710 *cras ires potius* is an extreme case; it means 'You ought (some time ago) to have decided to go to-morrow,' i. e. the obligation is past, the act future.

In one respect, however, the tense-force is well marked and strongly affects the meaning of the mode. The impf. 2d sing. (and in some cases in other persons) expresses an obligation which should have been felt in the past; e. g. Rud. 842 *caperes aut fustem aut lapidem* 'you should have taken . . .' The same thing is true of several questions in the 1st sing., the connection of which with 2d sing. is close. Obligation is one of the many meanings of the subjunctive in the present, though it is somewhat infrequent, and it is the only one which has, so to speak, survived the transfer from present time to past. The other shades of will or desire cannot be used of a past feeling. Command, entreaty, advice, permission, determination are excluded; only obligation remains. The influence of tense, therefore, though it is not wide, is especially clear and, when put into comparison with other influences, especially instructive.

The use of *non* with these cases will be considered later.

It is worth while to note, also, in connection with the question of tense, how infrequent the subjunctive of the past is in Plautus. There are 77 instances of the impf. and 7 of the plupf., against 1366 of the present. The subjunctive in the spoken language is a direct and simple expression of desire, dealing with the present or the immediate future. It is only in a complicated style, in the complexity of the conditional sentence or the subordinate clause, that the plupf. finds a place.

3. *Voice.*

The simplicity and directness of the feeling which lies behind the subjunctive is also shown by the infrequency of passives. They occur as follows: pres. 1st sing. 4, 2d sing. 1, 3d sing. 17,



3d plur. 5, impf. 3d sing. 1, 3d plur. 1. Of these, 6 are hypothetical, 4 are in parataxis, 4 are in the statement of a plan (a kind of half-paratactic use), 4 are in the peculiar phrase *mos geratur*, two or three are without context or are doubtful in text, and not more than half a dozen are in ordinary expressions of desire. It is impossible to tell without more trouble than the point is worth whether this proportion (29 out of 1600, less than 2 per cent.) is smaller than in the indic., but it seems probable that Plautus found the mode to some extent inconsistent with the passive voice, as it was inconsistent (though to a less degree) with the past tenses. It was a living expression of desire, not a mere symbol, as it became, for example, in the *cum* clause. Of these 29 cases, all but 5 are in the 3d. pers., where the personal relations are least direct. And where the passive uses are nearest to the directness of the active, it is because a 2d-pers. use really lies behind the 3d pers., as *fac proferantur* is almost the same as *proferas*.

#### 4. *The Meaning of the Verb.*

In Amph. 928 *ualeas, tibi habeas res tuas, reddas meas*, the three subjunctives are evidently, so far as the mode is concerned, identical; the close connection makes any other interpretation impossible. But if *ualeas* stood alone, as it often does, it would be called a wish, while *habeas* in 10 out of the 15 passages where it occurs expresses a permission, as here, and *reddas* is a demand. In modal force the three verbs are alike; the difference in effect is due to the difference in the meaning of the verbs.

The same thing appears in a few other cases where two verbs are used together: Cas. 611 *missurun es ad me uxorem . . . ? || ducas* (permission) *easque in maxumam malam crucem* (curse); Pers. 352 *inimici famam non ita ut natast ferunt. || ferant eantque in maxumam malam crucem*; Ps. 1015 *quid nunc? || argentum des, abducas mulierem*, a demand or expression of will and a permission or expression of willingness. A few other cases occur here and there, the difference growing slighter as the two verbs approach in meaning.

The classification of acts of will according to the nature of the action willed appears to rest upon a good psychological basis. The attitude of the mind in willing that another person shall retain an object which belongs to him is different from the attitude of willing that he shall give up what is not his. Through all the long succession of choices and determinations, the mind is

constantly changing its tone by slight and almost imperceptible degrees. Language, it is true, does not find distinct expression for each of these varying shades of will, but they exist in the mind of the speaker and are felt, by suggestion, by the hearer, and therefore become a restricting and modifying force, shaping the modal meaning.

The same conclusion follows from the modal behavior of single verbs. *mereo* (-or) is used 5 times, all in the limited sense *non (quid) merear (mereat)*, like the English 'I would not do it for the world.' The meaning of the verb inclines it, though it does not necessarily confine it, to expressions of hypothetical determination, excluding the ordinary jussive uses. *patiar* is found only in 1st sing., in repudiating sentence questions; *Asin.* 810 *egone haec patiar aut taceam?*, *Men.* 559 *egone hic me patiar esse in matrimonio . . . ?* In these cases it is an insertion, like *uin* or like *dicam* in *quis* questions. Its sense does not exclude it from other uses (*perpetiare* is used once in advice), but it makes it peculiarly fitted for a single use. *habeas* is usually an ironical permission, though it is also used in other ways. *dicam* occurs 33 times, but only twice in expressions of will, both in repudiating sentence questions. It is inserted in *quis* questions 16 times, is used in parataxis 8 times and 7 times in hypothetical (or perhaps here I may say potential) uses. *dicat* is used once and *dicant* 4 times in hypothetical senses; that is, out of 55 cases of *dicere* in the subjunctive, 12 are hypothetical, much beyond the ordinary proportion, which is about 1 : 50. This tendency toward the hypothetical may be like the English 'I should think'; but I am not concerned here with the explanation; whatever that may be, the fact of the tendency of *dicere* away from the ordinary uses is plain. The verbs used in the 1st person plural are all verbs of activity; there are no cases of *esse*, *scire*, *dicere*, *habere*, *uolle*. The marked subjunctive force of this person almost excludes verbs which are strictly *verba sentiendi et declarandi*. The verb *esse* might be expected to show an equal distribution over the whole range of subjunctive use. It is, however, limited in three directions:—a) It is essentially passive in meaning and therefore unfitted for the more direct and vigorous expressions of will. Among the 11 cases where it is used of desire, there is no case of demand or command. The two cases in 2d sing. are the mildest kind of permission; the seven cases in 3d sing. are either concessions (*sit per me quidem*) or expressions of propriety, of the

character that a type should have (*improbis sit cum improbis*). *b*) Its general and vague sense calls especially for paratactic additions, which are used in 29 of the 92 cases and by which greater directness and force can be given to the verb (*fac sis frugi*). Other defining words, adverbs and particles, are also unusually frequent with it. *c*) The fact that *esse* combines with a predicate shades its sense in various ways and gives rise to some narrowly restricted idioms, especially in wishes like *saluos sis, male sit tibi*.

No single usage of the subjunctive is more distinctly marked than the wishes which contain *di* or the name of a god: *di te perdant, Iuppiter te perduit, ita me di ament*, etc.; they have been given above in some detail. One of the forces which bring about this distinctness has been spoken of above, under person and number; the fact that the gods are to be the actors shuts out many kinds of will. To this restricting agency another is added by the meaning of the verbs. The situation in which it would be natural to exhort or command or entreat a person to destroy himself would be very rare, and the natural result of the working of two restricting forces is to produce a group of sharply defined idioms.

One verb, *uelle*, is so remarkable in its modal behavior as to call for special notice, although the uses are not due so much to its limiting force as to its peculiar adaptability to the subjunctive mode. It is used in the present tense 78 times, of which 73 (or 74) are *uelim* and compounds. All other verbs together are used in 1st sing. pres. of desire or will not more than 20 or 30 times. In the impf. 1st sing. *uellem* and compounds are used 17 times, while other verbs are not used at all except with *utinam* or in questions or parataxis. That is, *uelle* is used three or four times as often as all other verbs together in expressions of will in the 1st person singular. The cases are classified above according to their syntactical relations, and the meaning of each group is given. *uellem* differs from *uelim* only in tense, expressing a present wish about a past act; it is never the subjunctive of *uolebam*.

As to the force of *uelim*, the following points deserve notice:

1) *uelim* is not in Plautus a subjunctive of 'mild assertion' or of 'modesty.' The proof of this is in the cases themselves, of which full lists are given above. In most cases any such meaning is absolutely excluded, for example, in the cases which express a

curse (*pulmoneum edepol nimis uelim uomitum uomas; perii. || uerum sit uelim; in anginam ego nunc me uelim uorti*). In a few cases, taken alone, such an interpretation is not impossible, though it is not anywhere necessary. As all these cases must be essentially alike, we are bound to adopt that interpretation which is possible for all, not that which is possible for only a part of the cases. The instances which seem most like a mild assertion are those with *malim*, which are really influenced by the comparative degree (cf. *potius*).

2) There is no stronger evidence that *uelim* is potential. The closest parallel should be *faxim*, which is always hypothetical, but *faxim* regularly has a protasis either in the same sentence or in the immediate context, while *uelim* has a protasis in only 5 cases (these are not included in the lists above), 4 with *si possim* (*possit*). In the large majority of cases the sense excludes a potential meaning just as clearly as it excludes the idea of modesty or politeness.

3) *uelim* is in Plautus a sign of a wish, an optation, parallel in the main to *utinam*. This usage is mentioned in some of the grammars,<sup>1</sup> as a secondary use of *uelim*. It may have been secondary in classical Latin, but in Plautus it is the first and the prevailing use. I should explain it as having arisen by attraction through parataxis. The simple subjunctive, *ueniat* for instance, is frequently so indefinite as to call for a defining addition (see below, on parataxis). Alone *ueniat* might mean 'tell him to come,' 'let him come,' 'make him come,' 'I desire (will) that he should come' or 'I wish he would come.' Of the various paratactic additions which supply the needed definition, *uolo* emphasizes the will, while *uelim*, repeating the mode of *ueniat*, emphasizes the modal force, the optative, and differentiates (*uolo*) *ueniat* 'I will that he should come,' from (*uelim*) *ueniat* 'I wish that he would come.' In the same way *patiar* is inserted into a repudiating sentence question, assuming the mode of the verb, which then becomes an infin., and *dicam* is inserted into *quis* questions. Cf. Verg. Aen. IV 24 *sed mihi uel tellus optem prius ima dehiscat*, X. 443 *cuperem ipse parens spectator adesset*. In this way *uelim* became, like *utinam*, a sign of the wish. In contrast with *uolo* it is a milder word, and it became finally almost a separate verb, meaning 'I wish,' and is used in this sense increasingly in later Latin with scarcely any feeling of its original optative force. But

<sup>1</sup> A. and G., 267, c; Gildersleeve, 261, 546, 2.

the continuance of its paratactic use in familiar style (*uelim* exists, Cic. ad Fam. I 9, 24; *uelim uerum sit*, ad Att. XV 4, 4) is a reminder of its origin.

If this hypothesis as to the origin and use of *uelim* is correct, the meaning of *uelle* determines its modal use, not, as in the case of some verbs, by its unfitness for certain uses, but by its peculiar adaptability to other (the wishing and willing) uses.

A further illustration of the effect of the meaning of the verb upon the modal force may be found by comparing the similar influence of verb-meaning upon other constructions. Blase, *Geschichte des Plusquamperfekts im Lat.*, pp. 9 f., 35 f., has shown how the shifted sense of the plupf. tense extends along the line of verbs of obligation, *oportuerat*, *debuerat*, *aequom erat*. Foth, *Verschiebung lateinischer Tempora*, in Boehmer's *Roman. Stud.*, 1876, pp. 243 ff., shows that the peculiar present sense of the perfects *fui* 'I am no more,' *habui* 'I have no longer,' is the result of verb-meaning. A still better, because more distinctly independent, support may be found in the discussion of Greek tenses by Hultsch, *Die erzählenden Zeitformen bei Polybios*, which I know only through the review in *A. J. P.* XVI 2 (62), by C. W. E. Miller. Exactly as the inherent temporal force of Greek verbs modifies and limits the meaning of tenses, so that the aorist of one verb is not the same as the aorist of another, so does the different modal meaning of verbs modify and limit the modal force.

From these suggestions, imperfect and superficial as I am conscious that they are, I draw two conclusions. In the first place, it is obvious that a consideration of the effect of the verb-meaning upon the mode, intensifying or lessening or shifting the modal force, may be of considerable service in accurate interpretation. In the second place, though the verb-meaning alone may not be the cause of idioms or of restricted and precise usages, it may combine with other forces to produce such usages. The most marked illustration is in the wishes like *saluos sis, di te perdant*. And when several forces are thus combined, a very distinct influence may be exerted upon a great number of subjunctive usages.

The influences thus far considered, from person, number, tense, voice and verb-meaning, are inherent in the form. No subjunctive can exist without feeling some or all of them. The forces which remain to be considered are exerted upon the subjunctive by

other words in the sentence. These are apart from the subjunctive form, but, as a bare subjunctive, without other words, is of rare occurrence, and even then the preceding sentences influence the mode, we may say that the form of the sentence, which is to be treated next, is almost as necessary and inherent an influence as person and number.

### 5. *The Interrogative Sentence.*

The first and most striking fact is the difference in extent of usage between the subjunctive in questions and the subjunctive in non-interrogative sentences. Omitting *uelim* and cases with *utinam*, but including the hypothetical uses and the indefinite 2d pers., the statistics stand thus :

	Non-interrog.	Interrog.
1st sing.,	34	212
2d sing.,	177	24
3d sing.,	179	20

These figures, with the ratio of 1 : 6 in 1st sing. more than reversed in the 2d and 3d sing., are in themselves proof that the relation of the subjunctive to the sentence differs with the form of the sentence, or, in other words, that the interrogative form is a force which favors the use of the 1st sing., while it partially excludes the 2d and 3d sing. The difference is in the changed relation of speaker and willer in the question. In the non-interrogative sentence in 1st sing. the speaker, the willer and the actor are one person; in the question the speaker asks (or exclaims) about the will of the other person in regard to his (the speaker's) action. The speaker and the willer are two different persons. *sed maneam etiam* means, in full, 'I will (judge, decide) that I should remain'; *maneam?* means 'do you will that I should remain?' The first situation is rare, the second is very common. We must therefore note that in questions in 1st sing. we are dealing with a subjunctive which seems to be the same as the 1st sing. in non-interrogative sentences, but which is in reality different in the very important point of the relation of speaker and actor to willer. The situation in questions in 1st sing. in fact corresponds (with some exceptions, which will be noticed) rather to the 2d sing. in non-interrogative sentences. And, on the other hand, the question in 2d sing. corresponds to the non-interrogative 1st sing., in that the willer and actor are one, though the speaker

is a different person. That is, *abeam*? may be said to be the interrogative form of *abeas*, and *abeas*? 'you want to go away?' the interrogative of *abeam* 'I want to go away.'

But beside this general effect produced by the interrogative form, the particular kind of question also affects the mode in narrower but equally distinct ways.

The sentence question with simple subjunctive (without parataxis) is largely exclamatory. Of the 77 sentence questions, all but six or eight are repudiating. The repudiation is not a matter of mode; questions of the same form, with *egone*, etc., or exclamatory repetitions without a particle are always repudiating, even with the indicative. When the previous sentence contains a statement, the statement is rejected; when it contains an expression or implication of will, the repudiation is directed upon the will. Occasionally special emphasis leads to a separation of the will and the repudiation, as in Poen. 149 *egone istuc ausim facere*?, where *faciam* is expanded into *ausim facere*, in order to make the repudiation stronger, as 'I should not wish (venture) to do that' is stronger than 'I would not do it.'

In these cases the subjunctive is not dubitative or deliberative. It is a simple subjunctive of will or desire, repeated with the necessary change of person and corresponding in general to the 2d sing. non-interrogative.<sup>1</sup> There are, however, a few cases which correspond to the 1st sing. in soliloquy in non-interrogative sentences. They are the disjunctive questions in Cist. 641, Curc. 589, Merc. 128 (but this is better taken as an indirect question); in form Pers. 26 *deisne . . . aduorser? cum eis belligerem . . .?* is deliberative and in soliloquy, but the sense is repudiating. In a few cases, where *quid agam (faciam)?* precedes, there is a slight pretence of deliberation. But the whole number is small, certainly less than one-twelfth of the sentence questions.

It has been said that the repudiating exclamations reject the expressed or implied desire of the other person. But will can be repudiated only by will. In the brief and typical form *abi. || abeam*? the exclamation means 'You want me to go away!', but it also implies 'I don't want to go away.' The will of the person addressed is repeated in the mode, the will of the speaker is indicated by the form of the sentence. Now, in many cases the previous implication of will is not strong, while the repudiation is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the latest and best discussion of these questions by Wilh. Guthmann, Ueber eine Art unwilliger Fragen im Lat., Nürnberg, 1891.

definite and positive. In such cases the force of the mode is weakened to a claim or an expression of obligation, so that it might, at first sight, be overlooked entirely, and the sentence might be called deliberative because only the will of the speaker is apparent. E. g., St. 297 *nunc ultro id deportem?* is in a soliloquy; the idea has occurred to the speaker, as if it were a suggestion from without, that he might offer his good news unasked. But he at once rejects the idea by the form of the exclamation, and makes the rejection plainer by the next words, *hau placet neque id uiri officium arbitror*. It is only when the suggestion is faint and there is no rejection in the form of the sentence, that the question can properly be called deliberative. There are few cases as near the line as St. 297; usually a fairly careful examination of the context makes the case plain. The will of the speaker, in all such exclamations, is suggested by the form of the sentence and has nothing whatever to do with the mode.

None of these forms is a true question, asked in order to have a reply. The subjunctive alone was too vague, too liable to confusion with repudiation or deliberation. For a true question, clearly expressed, the will must be separated from the act willed. A question in regard to the act would be either a simple form of sentence question (with *-ne* appended to the verb) or a *quis* question; a question in regard to the will was expressed by the insertion of *uin* in parataxis, as in Men. 606 *uin hunc rogem?*, Poen. 990 *uin appellem hunc Punice?* This form of question occurs 26 times (lists above). It must of course be supposed that there was a time when the bare subjunctive, *appellem* or perhaps *appellemne*, was capable of expressing this sense, but the form *uin appellem* expressed it so much more clearly that *appellem* alone fell back into the more restricted function of repudiation, and the intermediate forms (*appellemne*) fell out of use.

With the *quis* question the matter is somewhat more complicated, since the variety in the form of the question is greater. In general, there are here also two lines of usage, differing according as they relate to the will of the speaker or to the will of the person addressed. They are well illustrated in the *quid faciam?*, *quid agam?* forms, which are given in some detail in the lists. *quid faciam* is usually a question for advice or direction, following an impv. or its equivalent, and answered, if at all, by an impv. or equivalent. At the other extreme *quid ego nunc faciam?* is



usually in soliloquy and deliberative, and *quid ego nunc agam?* is invariably so, with no reference to the will of another person. Between these extreme uses *quid ego faciam (agam)?* and *quid nunc faciam (agam)?* are used either way, perhaps leaning a little more toward the deliberative. There is but one explanation of these facts. They illustrate the gradual advance of language, by the formation of special idioms, from a single widely inclusive expression to more specialized and precise expressions. *quid faciam?* was once used for both functions, to ask for advice or to express deliberation. But as the difference between these functions was felt, *quid faciam?* was expanded into *quid ego nunc faciam?* for the deliberative, and *quid faciam?* retained only the more direct function. For the most precise expression of a question in regard to the will of another person it was expanded, as the sentence question was, by the insertion of *uis* into *quid uis faciam?* or, as in Most. 556, into *quid nunc faciundum censes?* That these are all one and the same 'subjunctive' seems to me beyond question, and that subjunctive use is the same that is found in all exclamatory repetitions of an expression of will, i. e. is itself a subjunctive of will. It is modified, first, by the fact that it is in a question and therefore is concerned with the will of the person addressed, and, second, by the use of a question that is originally meant for dialogue in monologue, where the speaker addressed the question to himself, *quid faciam?* 'What do you want me to do?' then becomes 'What do I want myself to do?,' and, as in soliloquy in non-interrogative sentences, the self-address confines the will to narrow limits, to ideas of determination or choice or propriety, as in *sed maneam etiam* or *taceam optimumst*. Further, such a question, 'What am I to do?,' spoken in soliloquy, suggests ideas like 'What can I do?,' which have sometimes led to the use of the term potential for this kind of subjunctive; not improperly, if the fact is kept in mind that it is directly connected with the subjunctive of will. The name deliberative also applies well to these questions, though not so well to the mode. The deliberation is in the question more than in the subjunctive, and is expressed even in questions which have the indicative (*quid ago?*), where we do not speak of the 'deliberative indicative.'

The same general distinction between questions of will addressed to another person and questions of deliberation in soliloquy runs through all the *quis* questions. The forms are not so well marked

as in the idiomatic *quid faciam?*, nor can the connecting forms be pointed out so distinctly. In questions like *quem te diuom autem nominem?*, *quam ob rem ego argentum enumerem foras?* the force of the mode is obscured by various other ideas and is not so easily felt as in an empty form like *quid faciam?* The number of questions that can properly be called deliberative is small, but the distinction is a real one. It is supported, too, by the usage in indirect *quis* questions. These, omitting the cases where a question is not asked, but the statement is made that a question was asked (Becker in Studemund's *Stud.* I, p. 211 f.), depend either upon an inserted *uis* or upon *nescio* or its equivalent (Aul. 730, nunc mi incertumst quid agam. abeam an maneam an adeam an fugiam: quid agam edepol nescio).

Beside these general characteristics, common to all *quis* questions, there are certain peculiarities which are due to the form of *quis*. These have been given in the lists, and I note here only the more striking.

*quo modo* is in all cases but one an appeal implying *nullo modo*, e. g. M. G. 1206 *quo modo ego uiuam sine te?*, and this runs easily into a translation by *can*, as in some cases of *quid faciam?* Cf. Ps. 236 *quonam uincere pacto possim animum?*

Questions with *quid* 'why' and *quor* regularly imply a negative answer. A question in regard to the motive or reason for acting is of necessity argumentative, and the argumentative tone excludes command, so that the subjunctive expresses only a vague sense of obligation, imposed by the person addressed and repudiated by the speaker. Cf. the same tendency in repudiating sentence questions.

In *qui ego istuc credam?* (the only use of *qui* 'how') there is the same argumentative and rejecting sense, but it is here modified by the meaning of the verb *credere*. Belief is not under the control of the will; *credas* would inevitably slip into 'You should (ought to) believe'; even *crede mihi* is an appeal. And *qui . . . credam?* rejects the implied obligation to believe by the implied answer 'I cannot.'

On the other hand, the forms *quem*, *quo* 'whither,' *quid* as object, do not modify the force of the subjunctive, except in the general ways noted above for all questions.

From what has been said I hope it may be clear that the interrogative form of sentence is a most potent force in influencing the meaning of the mode. That mode is the same, in origin and

in essential meaning, in questions as in non-interrogative sentences, but the question form excludes or greatly restricts the more direct expressions of will, introduces the reference to the will of another person, and implies by the repudiating form an exertion of the speaker's will. In certain idioms with specialized forms of *quis*, the idea of will is diminished to a sense of obligation, and by association and suggestion the subjunctive so far approaches the potential meaning that it may be translated by *can* and negated by *non*.

With the following sections I come to consider the meaning and effect of added words, not at all a part of the mode, which help out the mode where it lacks clearness and add related meanings.

Looked at historically, the sentence is the result of gradual accretions gathering about a nucleus. The single cries or words which were the primitive signs of emotion and thought corresponded in their vagueness and inclusiveness—in their applicability to a wide range of different occasions and objects—to the vagueness of primitive thought. The words which gradually added themselves to the nucleus were the signs of the gradual rise into consciousness of one or another modifying or defining aspect of the general idea. Such new features of the thought and the new words which represented them were on the one hand related to the original germ and had elements of likeness to it, and on the other hand they added something which was not contained in the original sentence. This process of sentence-growth, which must have been infinitely complex, still continues in language as long as the language is in a formative stage, repeating itself on a small scale in the growth of idiomatic phrases. The expansion of *quid faciam?* to *quid ego nunc faciam?* is of this sort. And along the line of this general principle is to be found the explanation of nearly all subjunctive parataxis in Plautus.

#### 6. *Parataxis*.

There are some 315 or 320 cases of paratactic use of the subjunctive, occurring as set down in the accompanying table. The group at the end, mainly of verbs of saying and causing, comprises the cases of indirect quotation, in which the leading verb states that an expression of will has been used. The remaining cases, about 300 in number, are all of one kind. The

leading verb is rarely modified by adverbs or phrases ; it usually stands next to the subjunctive, either before or after it, and it frequently comes in the middle of the sentence. An examination of a few of these cases, of which full lists have been given, will make it entirely clear that what is called the leading verb, syntactically, is not the leading verb in thought, but an addition,

<i>Present.</i>						
	1	2	3	1	2	3
sine,	18	1	14			1
fac, facito, facite, 9	20	10		3	8	
iube,			3			2
uide,		2				1
roga,			1			
cedo,	2					
da, date,	1		1			
mane,	1					
caue,	1	10	1		1	1
uolo,		8	7	2	3	1
malo,		1	1			
nolo,		5	3			1
opsecro, etc.,				3		
credo, etc.,				1		
nil interdico,						1
faxo,		8	4			2
faciam,			2			1
uelim,		4	7			
malim,		1	1			
uellem,						
malle,						
(si) exoptem,						1
faxim,		1	1			5
(utinam) faxint,						1
optumumst,	6	1				
necessest,	1					
decretumst,	1					
certumst,	5					
nil opust,			1			
licet,		4	2			
decet,						1
censen,	1					
(quid) uis,	8					
uin, uis,	26	1		2		
credin,			1			
potin,		2				
Other indic.,	4			2		1
	84	69	61	7	10	28
						Present, 259; other tenses, 58. Total, 317.

Perf. 2d sing., 1.

Perf. 2d sing., 16; 3d sing., 1; Sigm. aor. 2d sing., 16.

Lists entirely incomplete.

Incomplete. Impf. 2d sing., 2; 3d sing., 1.

Perf. 2d sing., 2; 3d sing., 3.

Perf. 3d sing., 2; 3d plur., 2.

Impf. 3d plur., 1; Plupf. 3d sing., 1; 3d plur., 1.  
Impf. 3d sing., 1.

Scattering, 8.

an insertion, into a sentence already formed. The germ of the sentence is the subjunctive verb; to it almost all the modifying words—subject, object, adverbs—belong, and the sentence would be intelligible, though not equally precise, without the indicative verb. In many cases sentences very similar or even absolutely identical occur without the added verb. With the few exceptions spoken of above—and I think it could be shown that these are not really exceptions—all cases of paratactic subjunctive in Plautus are of this kind.

It has been said above of the sentence in general that the additions to it have always something in common with the germ out of which they come, some element which is a repetition of an element in the central idea, and that they also bring something new, which was not before in the sentence. This is true also of the added paratactic verbs; they both repeat and amplify.

The idea which is taken up from the subjunctive verb and repeated may appear in the form of the added verb or in its meaning or in both. It appears in the form when an impv., *sine, fac, uide*, is used with a subjunctive in 1st or 2d pers. Thus *amem* means 'I want to love you,' and *sine* repeats and emphasizes the expressed desire; *uideas* expresses a command which the impv. *fac* repeats; and so in *fac sciam, fac sis frugi, praecepta sobrie adcuras face, linguam confescas face*, and many more. Any of these subjunctives might stand alone, but the jussive force would be less clearly expressed than it is when it is strengthened by the impv. verb.

The meaning of the subjunctive is repeated in the meaning of the leading verb by *uolo, malo, nolo* (together about one-tenth of all the cases), by *opsecro, quaeso, oro* (the lists of which, I regret to say, are entirely incomplete), used with the 2d and 3d pers. chiefly, where the speaker is emphasizing or defining his own will, and by *licet, nil opust, decet*, which define the nature of the desire. Thus *animum aduortas* may stand alone as an expression of will, but the will of the speaker is doubled when *uolo* is added. So *taceas malo quam . . ., habeas licet, hoc agas uolo, iuris iurandi uolo gratiam facias*, and many more. The phrases in the impersonal group, *optimumst, necessest, decretumst, certumst*, are used almost exclusively with 1st sing. and repeat those modified kinds of desire which are latent in these infrequent forms. *sed maneam etiam* might perfectly well have been explained by *optimumst*, as *sed taceam* (Epid. 59) would have

been intelligible without *optumumst*; or *quod perdundumst properem perdere* might be glossed by *necessesst*. These all belong to the subjunctive of will. The subjunctive of view or opinion is occasionally repeated in *censeo*, *credo*, *scio*, though these verbs, used with the subjunctive, may express an opinion as to what is best, as in *sed maneam etiam, opinor*, where *opinor* is nearly the same as *optumumst*. As the more direct expressions of will imply a determination on the part of the speaker to see that the command is obeyed, they are emphasized by *faxo, faciam*.

In a few cases the idea of the mode is repeated both in the form and the meaning of the added verb. So especially *sine*, and also *roga, iube*, though these have more to do with defining the relation of persons. The group of subjunctives, *uelim, malim, uellem, mallem*, also belong here, repeating by their meaning the will-force of the mode and by their form defining the will as a wish. *faxim* is used only in apodosis, where the subjunctive verb was or would have been the apodosis if *faxim* had not been thrust in; e. g. Pers. 73 *si id fiat, faxim nusquam appareant*, Amph. 511 *si sciat . . . , ego faxim ted Amphitruonem esse malis*. The hypothetical idea is doubled. The one case of *faxint* is perhaps clearer; Amph. 632 *utinam di faxint infecta dicta re eueniant tua*, where the added thought, *di faxint*, is a wish because *utinam eueniant* alone would have been a wish. These cases afford, I think, some independent support to the explanation of *uelim* given above. The use of *uis* in *quis* questions and of *uin* in sentence questions may also be mentioned here. The verb by its meaning repeats the meaning of the mode and by its combination with *quis* or *-ne* repeats the question.

Repetition, however, is not the function of these added verbs; it is only the condition which makes their close union with the subjunctive possible. Their function is to define, to bring out more clearly the particular kind of will or desire which is expressed too vaguely in the mode, or to express with precision something in the relation of the persons involved which the subjunctive merely suggests.

As to the meaning of the mode, to illustrate the definition of it by examples would be to repeat the lists already given. Will in its more direct forms is defined by *uolo, uis, uin*; wish (optation) by *uelim*; preference by *malo*; determination and choice by *faxo, decretumst, certumst*; entreaty by *cpsecro, oro*; permission by *licet*; propriety by *decet*; necessity by *necessesst*; decision and

sense of obligation by *optumumst*; belief, opinion by *credo, censeo, scio*. The expressions of desire which appear infrequently or not at all in parataxis are those which are in themselves most explicit, the 1st plur. and the 2d sing. of command: the latter, however, is frequently intensified by *fac* or *uolo*. The variety and extent of these uses, defying precise classification, indicate the variety of application of which the subjunctive was capable.

It is chiefly in the 3d person that the relation of the persons involved needs definition, because here the hearer may be concerned with the action, though his part is left to suggestion. In many cases this makes no difference. When the subject is in the plural or is one of a class, and, generally, when the hearer is merely a bystander, other forces, chiefly due to person and number, limit the range of the mode so that further definition is unnecessary. But when both hearer and actor are definite persons, it is often necessary for the sake of clearness that the hearer's part should not be left to suggestion. The varieties of usage and the corresponding paratactic forms have been sufficiently illustrated above. Amph. 951 *euocate huc Sosiam*: . . . *Blepharonem arcessat*, suggests the same idea which is definitely expressed by the addition of *iube*<sup>1</sup> in Most. 930 *dic me aduenisse filio* . . . *iube in urbem ueniat*. Most. 920 *hodie accipiat* implies that the slave is to attend to the matter, and in Pers. 445 *facito mulier ad me transeat*, this idea is important enough to find expression in *facito*. But, as has been said, many verbs with *fac* are passives and have few or no parallels outside of parataxis. Compare also M. G. 1100 *aurum habeat sibi* . . . : *sumat, habeat, auferat*, with M. G. 1244 *sine ultro ueniat, quaeritet, desideret*. In all these cases it is the need of more precise expression of the hearer's part in the action which has led to the addition of the imperative.

Some of the sporadic cases of defining parataxis are especially interesting. Of the nine cases in 1st sing. with *fac*, all are with verbs of knowing, *noscam, uideam, sciam*; a phrase meaning 'I desire to know' and addressed directly to another person is in effect an appeal for information. The phrases *da absorbeam*

<sup>1</sup>Occasionally *iube* loses its proper sense, as in Ter. Adelph. 914 f. *iube nunciam dinumeret ille Babylo uiginti minas*; see Spengel's note. So in Most. 426 *iube uenire nunciam*, like Engl. slang 'now bring on your man,' and this is the sense once with a paratactic subjunctive, Rud. 708 *iube modo accedat prope*.

(Curc. 313), *cedo bibam* (Truc. 367, Most. 373, where the MSS give *ut bibam*, which may be right), *mane sis uideam* (Most. 849), and perhaps *concede inspiciam* (Curc. 427) illustrate a connection between the added verb and the subjunctive in which the amount, so to speak, of addition greatly exceeds the repetition. That is, *mane uideam* is a brief expression for *mane et sine uideam*, and *cedo bibam* is for *cedo et fac bibam*. Cf. Most. 344 *da illi quod bibat*, where the thought is somewhat more expanded, and Verg. Aen. IV 683 f. *date uulnera lymphis Abluam et extremus siquis super halitus errat Ore legam*. Capt. 961 *quod ego fatear, credin pudeat quom autumes?* is an expansion by the insertion of *credin*, as *uin* is inserted with a slightly different meaning; cf. also M. G. 614 *quodne uobis placeat, displiceat mihi?* In the same way *potin* is prefixed to *abeas* in Pers. 297, Cas. 731, a phrase which later expands into *potin ut abeas*. In Most. 679 f. *euocadum aliquem ocus, roga circumducat*, *roga* is substituted for the more common *iube* because the *aliquis* was not the speaker's slave.

The group of cases in which the leading verb is an indicative (other than *uolo*, *credo*, *faxo*, etc.), in all about a dozen cases, differ somewhat from the ordinary parataxis and have been passed over in the foregoing remarks. They approach more nearly the usual conception of parataxis as the joining in thought of two sentences, each of which is complete in itself. Yet in most cases a distinct relationship to complementary parataxis can be traced. Thus in Amph. 257, *uelatis manibus orant ignoscamus peccatum suom*, the mode is repeated in the meaning of *orant*. In M. G. 54, at *peditastelli quia erant, siui uiuerent*, there is combined a quotation of a past thought ("I said to myself '*uiuant*'") and a repetition of the subjunctive in *sino*. So in nearly all the verbs which quote a subjunctive, *uoltis*, *suades*, *impetravi*, *rogarat*, *coniurauimus*, *accuratum habuit*, there is an element of meaning which harmonizes with the mode. In Stich. 624, *dixi in carcerem ires*, there is no repetition of the mode, such as would be expressed by *iussi*, but simple quotation. The greatest expansion of the prefixed verb, so great that it would perhaps be correct to speak of it as an independent sentence, appears in St. 177 *hoc nomen repperi eo quia paupertas fecit ridiculus forem*, and Rud. 681 *quae uis (the noun) uim mi adferam ipsa adigit*.

I have said nothing thus far of the negative verbs, *nolo*, *nil interdico* (*interduo*), *nil opust*, or of *caue*. The process of accre-



tion cannot have produced the negative sentence out of the affirmative; every negative sentence must have been negative in thought from the beginning of its conception. Such a phrase, therefore, as *nolo ames* (Cas. 233) does not begin with *ames* and then prefix *nolo*; it begins with the prohibition, *ne ames*, and expands that by the insertion of *uolo* into *ne-uolo ames*. With *caue* the matter is more complicated. It is used 47 times; 10 times with pres. 2d sing., 16 with perf. 2d sing., 16 with the sigmatic aorist 2d sing., the rest scattering. These are the forms which are also largely used with *ne* in prohibitions, and in many uses *caue* and *ne* are exactly parallel. Thus Capt. 439 *caue fidem fluxam feras* (*geras* GS.), and 443 *infidelior mihi ne fuas quam ego sum tibi*; Capt. 431 *horunc uerborum causa caue tu mi iratus fuas*, and Amph. 924 *ignosce, irata ne sies*; Pers. 816 *caue sis me attigas, ne tibi . . . malum magnum dem*, and Truc. 276 *ne attigas me*. So *ne feceris* and *caue feceris*, *ne dixeris* and *caue dixeris*, *ne istuc dixis* and *caue tu istuc dixis*. On the other hand, there are no cases of *caue* parallel to the frequent *ne postules* (*censeas, frustra sis*) and none like *molestus ne sis*, which is common. The sentences with *caue* are generally longer and are more frequently accompanied by *sis* (*si uis*). It would appear that while *caue* has in a considerable number of cases sunk to a mere negative, not to be distinguished from *ne*, it has also retained enough of its proper verbal force to prevent its use in certain forms of prohibition. It is not likely that the sinking to a negative force can have occurred except through the use in combination with another verb, for a prohibition implies an action to be prohibited. As long as it was used alone, *caue* would mean 'take care!' or 'beware!' It could mean 'don't' only when some definite action was proposed. The prohibition with *ne* must be older than the prohibition with *caue*, and that in its turn is probably older than *caue ne*, which is rare in early Latin (only half a dozen times in Plautus). All this would be explained if we suppose that *caue* was prefixed to the subjunctive, chiefly in 2d sing., on the analogy of other impvv., *sine, fac, iube, uide*, as a periphrasis of the *ne* prohibition, but with a slightly different force, emphasizing the watchfulness and the activity of the person addressed, in accordance with the proper meaning of *cauere*. This would be analogous to the prefixing of *uelim* to differentiate the wish from the expression of will by means of *uolo*. The natural sphere of such a use would be in the more elaborate and

formal prohibitions, but it would tend to degenerate into an equivalent of *ne*, though never so far as to be used at all frequently in blunt prohibitions like *molestus ne sis*.<sup>1</sup>

The term parataxis, which has been used above of the prefixing of a verb to a subjunctive, is commonly employed to designate the dependence of a sentence complete in itself upon another complete sentence, without any sign of the subordination. It is in this sense that the word is used by Draeger, §§368-75, and by Stolz-Schmalz, §208, and this is sometimes regarded as the only proper use of the term.<sup>2</sup> But this kind of parataxis is only the most obvious form of dependence without subordinating sign, which has been accepted as representative of parataxis in general. It needs to be broken up, to be analyzed, so that the different varieties of the process which has produced all subordinating words may be more accurately understood. The program of Weissenhorn (*Parataxis Plautina*, Burghausen, 1884) and the dissertation of Weninger (*de parataxis in Ter. fab. uestigiis*, Erlangen, 1888) follow the lines of Draeger, and the fuller work which seemed to be promised by Becker's program (*Beiordnende und unterordnende Satzverbindung*, Metz, 1888) has not yet appeared. Lindskog (*de parataxi et hypotaxi ap. prisc. lat.*, Lundae, 1896) deals chiefly, though not wholly, with what may be called *correlative* parataxis, where the two sentences are balanced by the repetition of like words or by some other similarity in the structure (Tac. Ann. I 28 *tarda sunt, quae in commune expostulantur: priuatam gratiam statim mereare, statim recipias*). This variety of parataxis must be fully studied in order to reach an understanding of the relative or of protasis and apodosis. In what has been said above I have dwelt upon the facts at greater length because the prefixing of the verb seems to be a different and hitherto little noticed variety of the subordin-

<sup>1</sup> It is possible that *caue ne* may have an independent origin from *caue: ne facias*, but it is also possible (and to me it seems more probable) that it is an expansion of *caue facias* by the insertion of *ne*, after *ne* had acquired conjunctive force. So I should explain some phrases with *ut* (e. g. *fac ut ualeas* as an expansion of *fac ualeas*), though doubtless in many cases both *ne* and *ut* were a part of the subordinated sentence. Another explanation of, e. g., *caue cadas* as meaning originally 'look out! you may fall' is difficult because *cadat* alone in Plautus would never mean 'you may fall,' and, if it had that meaning, would not take a prefixed imperative.

<sup>2</sup> So Earle, *Proc. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, Dec. 1894, p. 50. The prefixing of *βούλει, θέλεις*, which is like the insertion of *uis, uin*, he calls *verbal preposition*.

ating process, and to be of some value for the explanation of certain subordinate clauses. It will explain, in part, the limitation of the *ut* clause to certain kinds of leading verbs, the presence of the negative in the leading clause upon which a *quin* clause depends, and it has been largely instrumental in producing the indirect question. Any process through which subordinating force is acquired may fairly be called parataxis; this variety might be called *defining* or *complementary* parataxis.

Nothing could show more clearly than these constructions the wide applicability of subjunctive forms, or—if we attempt to group them and to speak of the meaning of the subjunctive—the inherent vagueness of the mode. In spite of the effect of person and number, of tense, voice, form of sentence, verb-meaning, all working more or less effectively toward precision, a paratactic addition is needed in about one-fifth of the cases in Plautus to bring out clearly the latent meaning. And the more one examines the cases, the more will the variety and beauty of this means of attaining to precise expression be apparent. They are a running commentary on the meaning of the mode, showing both by what they repeat and by what they add how the mode is to be interpreted. They show where and how the mode seemed inadequate to those who used it, and for correct interpretation, at least in colloquial Latin, they are of more service than any other means at our disposal.

Of other words, adverbs and particles, which limit and define the meaning of the mode it is not necessary to speak in detail. Most of them are well known, and for the present purpose it is necessary only to allude to the need of distinguishing between the function of the mode and that of the particle. In Pers. 542, *uideam modo mercimonium. || aequa dicis*, the restrictive force is not in the mode; *uideam* alone might have any one of the meanings possible in the 1st sing., 'I want to,' 'I had better,' 'I must,' but *modo* adds a restrictive idea which is contained, it is true, in the mode, but not expressed by it. So *ita* in *ita di me ament* may be taken to be a sign of the asseveration. With *utinam* the precise steps by which it became a sign of the wish are unknown, but its use shows the need and function of such defining words. With the most distinct and vehement forms of wish it is used very rarely or not at all. Thus in the 3d plur. it is used three times, but not at all with the 118 cases which

contain the word *di*. With these *ut*, a less distinct sign of the wish, is used four times and *at*, *quin*, *qui* still more frequently. In the 3d sing. the forms *quae res bene uortat*, *bene (male) sit*, *Iuppiter te perdat*, never have *utinam*, though *ut te Mercurius perdat* occurs once. The function of *utinam* is to distinguish wishes of a general character, not already specialized by verb-meaning or by direct mention of the gods, from other uses of the subjunctive with which they might be confused. The reference of *proin*, *proinde* to the preceding thought gives it a certain argumentative force, which makes it unfitted for use with the more intense expressions of will. It is found especially with the 2d sing., though somewhat with other persons, in advice or direction, and may be said to be to some extent a mark of such uses of the subjunctive. In the same way other words, especially comparatives, are associated with the potential uses, which will be discussed below.

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